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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
MADSONIA REALTY COMPANY,
a corporation,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.ZION'S SAYINGS BANK & TRUST
CO:JIPANY, a corporation, as executor of the Estate of Richard W.
:Jiadsen, deceased, and LARETA C.
:MADSEN,

Case No. 7589

Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF PLAIN·TIFF AND RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts by appellants (pp. 1-7) is
correct but incomplete. Appellants do not dispute or complain of any of the findings of the trial court and we
believe a more complete statement of the issues framed
by the pleadings and facts as found by that Court will
facilitate the work of this Honorable Court.
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

This case was commenced by the filing of a '' Petition for Order Directing E~ecutor to Execute Deed" in
the Probate Division of the District Court in the matter
of the Estate of Richard W. Madsen, Deceased. The only
relief prayed was that Zion's Savings Bank & Trust
Company, as E~ecutor of the Estate of Richard W. Madsen, deceased, execute and deliver to Madsonia Realty
Company a deed to certain property which had been
bought and paid for hy Madsonia Realty Company.
LaReta C. Madsen intervened and filed a demurrer to
the petition. She acted in her individual capacity as an
heir and widow and not for or on behalf of the executor.
The executor also filed an answer to the petition. The
demurrer of LaReta C. Madsen was overruled and she
filed an answer and counterclaim to the petition. The
petitioner, Madsonia Realty Company, filed a reply
joining issue with LaReta G. Madsen on her claim to a
dower interest in the real estate or an interest in the proceeds from the sale. The case was transferred to the civil
division of the court, given a civil number (87361) and a
fee was paid by the rpJaintiff as in the case of filing an
original civil action. The case was then designated
"Madsonia Realty Company, Plaintiff, vs. Zion's Savings Bank & T'rust Company and La Reta C. Madsen,
Defendants'' and was thereafter treated in all respects as
a civil action rather than a petition in probate.
The Madsonia Realty Company is a corporation
which was organized in 1923 ( R. 71, Finding No. 1). R.
W. Madsen had been previously married and his first
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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wife died in 1932 (R. 182). R. W. Madsen and LaReta
C. :Jiadsen, the widow of the deceased, were married
October 30, 1935 (R. 71, Finding No. 3). At the time of
the second marriage, R. W. ~Iadsen owned the property
at 667 East 1st South Street in Salt Lake City which had
been his family residence (R. 71, Finding No. 4). On
January 31, 1937, R. \V. :Madsen sold the property in
question to :Jiadsonia Realty Company for $10,680.00
(R. 71, Finding No. 5). The consideration for said property was paid to R. W. :Madsen, but no deed was ever
executed by him to the corporation (R. 71, Finding No.
5). From the date of sale until the death of R. W. Madsen
the property was treated in all respects by him and by
1fadsonia Realty Company as the property of the company. 'The specific acts regarding ownership of the property by Madsonia are :
(a) The sale was entered on the books of
the corporation in the handwriting of R. W. Madsen, President and General lVIanager of the corporation (R. 71, Finding No.5).
(b) From that date until June 6, 1946, all
rents were collected by the corporation and
Madsonia Realty Company paid all taxes, upkeep
and repairs on the property (R. 71, 72, Finding
No.5).
(c) On June 6, 1946, the property was sold
to James 0. Peterson and C. Amelia Peterson for
$16,500.00. While the contract of sale was signed
by R. W. Madsen and his wife, LaReta, as sellers,
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"said Richard W. Madsen was in fact acting for
and on behalf of Madsonia Realty Company in the
signing of said contract of sale" (R. 72, Finding
No.6).
(d)· This sale was also entered on the books
of Madsonia Realty Company in the handwriting
of R. W. Madsen and the $4,000.00 down payment
was entered as a credit to the buyers on the books
of such corporation (R. 72, Finding No.6).
(e) Madsonia Realty Company showed a
profit on its books at the time of the sale of $9,428.49 (R: 72, Finding No. 6). (The excess in
profit over the actual difference between the purchase price and the sale [$16,500.00-----$10,680.00=
$5,820.00] is accounted for by depreciation which
had been entered on the books).
(f) This profit was. reported by Madsonia
on state and federal income tax returns for the
year 1946 and the taxes paid (R. 72, Finding No.
6, R.187, Exh. T., U., Wand X).
(g) All payments on the contract made by
the Petersons and their successors in interest were
deposited to the account of Madsonia and entered
on its books, this being done personally by R. W.
Madsen (R. 72, Finding No.6).
Subsequent to the death of R. W. Madsen the payments were made direct by the purchasers to Madsonia
Realty Company (R. 72, 73, Finding No.6).
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La.Reta C. ~Iadsen signed the Peterson contract of
June 6, 1946, voluntarily as the wife of R. W. Madsen
for the purpose of releasing her statutory dower under
Section 101-4-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, and at no
time did R . \Y. Madsen or any other person promi se her
all or any portion of the purchase price (R. 73, Finding
No. 7). There is no dispute but that R. W. Madsen was
paid the full agreed purchase price for the property.
Not only was his account with the corporation credited
with the full purchase price, but by April 5, 1937, '(three
months after the sale and credit to his account) his credits
had been withdrawn and the account balanced (Exh. F).
The_account
had previously been balanced and reopened
~,. """'} /,..P.S";
JtiJht 1, 1936. The account was meticulously kept as appears in Exh. F. and as will be more fully shown in this
brief under Point No. 6.
1

No contention is made that in 1937 $10,680.00 was
not a fair and adequate price. It further appears ''that
during the time of their marriage R. W. Madsen transferred to LaReta C. Madsen gifts, money and property
(in addition to all living expenses) of not less than
$49,000.00" (R. 73, Finding No. 8). These were the
values at the time the gifts were made, not present values.
The court found, and there is no dispute on the matter, that LaReta C. Madsen signed the contract of J nne 6,
1946, voluntarily as the wife of Richard W. Madsen, and
there were no misrepresentations by R. W. :Madsen or
any other person as an inducement to sign. She signed the
contract for the purpose of releasing her rights to dower
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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under Section 101-4-3, Utah Code Annotated 1943 and
there was no promise to pay her any part of the purchase
price (R. 73, Finding No. 7).
Another matter of inter·est and importance to this
litigation is the fact that the original answer and counterclaim of LaReta C. Madsen pleaded that R. W. Madsen
and Madsonia Realty Company were one and the same,
the corporation merely being the alter ego of R. W. Madsen. The pleading with regard to this is as follows:
''F. That the Madsonia Realty Company is
making claim to the property described in Paragraph 'B' hereof, as appears from their petition,
and LaReta C. Madsen alleges the fact to be that
Madsonia Realty Company, during the lifetime of
R. W. Madsen, was his alter ego and had no separate entity whatsoever and that any purported
transfer 'Of R. W. Madsen to the Madsonia Realty
Company i's a nullity and in truth and effect was
an attempt to transfer the property to himself.''
(R. 22)
On the morning of the trial LaReta C. Madsen filed
an amended answer and counterclaim, dropping the
claim of alter ego. The amended answer and counterclaim was permitted to 'be filed 'by the court at such time
with the understanding that all material allegations of
the answer and counterclaim be deemed denied. The
only objection raised by Madsonia to the amendment was
the elimination from the pleading of the allegations having to do with the disregard of the corporate ·entity, this
objection being upon the ground that 'Such matter was
necessarily a ~art of the case and the case could not be
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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decided favorably to the Madsonia Realty Company without holding that such corporation was not the aher ego of
R. W. Madsen and that it was, in fact, a separate entity.
The record with regard to this is as follows:
'·:MR. CANNON: If the Court please, we
would like the record to show that we have ohjected to the filing of the amended answer and
counterclaim, which withdraws the issue as to the
corporate alter ego or the disregard of the corporate entity. We think that that is necessarily
involved in this case and consequently object to it
being withdrawn.

"THE COURT: But you don't ask for any
time to meet any issues that may be framed here~
''~IR.

CANNON:

''THE COURT:
overruled.'' ( R. 97) .

No, we do not.
All right. The objection is

The foregoing facts, it seems to us, should be sufficient to decide this case without the necessity of argument. There is no dispute that R. W. Madsen sold the
property, received the purchas·e price, his estate was
increased to the extent of the purchase price, his wife released her dower by signing the contract when the property was sold to the Petersons and the parties treated the
transaction as closed. All 'payments by the Petersons
were turned over to 1\Iadsonia. Madsonia Realty Company had possession of the property for 11 years prior to
the death of R. W. Madsen, collected all rents, paid all
taxes, made all repairs and paid an income tax on capital
gain of $9,428.49. LaReta made no claim on the proceeds
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while her husband lived. Under these circumstances
equity and justice require that the executor and the widow
of the deceased do whatever is necessary to clear the
title to the property. However, since appellants have
presented a 60 page brief and will undoubtedly file a
reply brief r~espondent feels it must answer their arguments but will present the position of Madsonia Realty
Company as concisely as possible.

STA.TEMENT OF POINTS
RELIED UPON
POINT NO.1
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO A DEED FROM THE
EXE,CUTOR.

POINT NO.2
SHOULD IT BE HELD THAT PLAINTIFF IS NOT
ENTITLED TO A DEED FROM THE EXECUTOR, IT IS
CLEARLY ENTITLED TO A DECREE QUIETING TITLE
AGAINST THE EXECUTOR.

POINT NO.3
THE RIGHT OF THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT BARRED BY
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

POINT NO.4
LARETA C. MADSEN, THE WIDOW, HAS RELEASED
HER STATUTORY DOWER.
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POINT NO.5
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO AN ORDER REQUIRING
THE WIDOW TO DEED THE PROPERTY TO MADSONIA
REALTY COMPANY.

POINT NO.6
THE RELEASE OF DOWER WAS NOT SECURED BY
FRAUD.

POINT NO.7
LARETA C. MADSEN IS ESTOPPED, BY CLAIMING
THE BENEFITS OF THE WILL, FROM ASSERTING ANY
DOWER RIGHT IN THIS PARTICULAR PIECE OF REALTY.

POINTS numbered 2, 5 and 7 above are in effect
points on which we cross appeal. A decree quieting title
under Point No.2 is, however, unnepessary so long as the
order of the trial court requiring the executor to execute
,.~~Ptl"'t:/'n ra deed stands. Point No. 5 is urged by ~ee in any
event so as to preclude any possible further litigation.
Point No. 7 is an additional reason why LaReta C.
Madsen should not profit by her claims.
ARGUl\1ENT
POINT NO.1
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO A DEED FROM THE
EXECUTOR.

The argument hereunder includes our answer to appellants' Point No. II. Appellants claim as a defense
that we have "proved no compliance with ·the s·tatute of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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frauds.'' We do not claim that there is any instrument
in writing signed by the vendor R. W. Madsen which
sat~sfies the statute of frauds. We claim, however, that
there is sufficient performance of the contract to circumvent the necessity of a signed agreement, and the title
to the property is now held in trust for the plaintiff. Our
statutes recognize that 'OUr courts can enforce a trust
in a proper case without a signed written agreement and
also that specific performance of a contract may be had
even though there is no signed written agreement. Seetion 33-5-2 U. C. A. 1943 provides:

('r~ur
r·

0111

i

~±~1 .:

''Wills and Implied Trusts Excepted.
The next preceding section shall not be construed to affect the power of a testator in the disposition of his real estate by last will and testament; nor to prevent any trust from arising or
being extinguished by implioation or- operation of
law."
Section 33-5-8 U. C. A. 1943 provides:
"Right to Specific Performance not Affected.
Nothing in this chapter contained · shall be
construed to abridge the powers of courts to compel the specific performance of agreements in case
of part performance thereof.''
Each case having to do with specific performance of
a contract where there has been no compliance with the
statute of frauds is nece ssarily different. We must apply general principles to the facts of each case as they
arise. The general rule is set forth in the case of Besse
vs. McHenry, (Mont. 1931) 300 Pac. 199, at page 202 as
follows:
1
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"The part performance of an oral contract
which will avoid the statute of frauds may consist of any act which puts the party performing
in such a situation tha:t nonperformance by the
other would be a fraud upon the person executing
his part of the agreement according to its terms.
Eccles v. Kendrick, 80 Mont. 120, 259 P. 609; Shaw
v. ~fcNamara & ~iarlaw, 85 Mont. 389, 278 P. 836;
27 C. J. pp. 343, 344.''
This case was expressly approved by the Supreme
Court of Utah in the case of Utah Mercur Gold. Mining
Company t". Herschel Gold Mining Oompa(Yby, 103 Utah
249, 134 Pac. 2d 1094. This court stated:
''We are therefore finally thrown back on the
inquiry as to whether the complaint, revealing
that the contract for an extension of the written
lease for five years was oral, also alleged facts
sufficient to take it out of the statute. The acts
which are alleged to constitute part performance
must be in pursuance of the oral contract which
it is claimed 'said performance saves from the
death sentence of the statute. In Besse v.
:1\IcHenry, 89 Mont. 520, 300 P. 199 it was stated:
'' 'Part performance which will avoid
statue of frauds may consist of any act which
puts party performing in such position that
nonperformance 'by other would constitute
fraud.'''
The question of particular acts which constitute part
performance so as to take the case out of the statute of
frauds is discussed in 49 Am. Juris., at page 742. Under
Section 459 at page 766 the question discussed i'S whether
the payment of the consideration or a part thereof is
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sufficient to take the case out of the statute of frauds.
It is pointed out that there are some authorities whieh so
hold. It appears clear, however, that the payment of the
full purchase price, accompanied by other acts, and particularly the delivery of possession, are sufficient. See
:Section 461 at page 770. The rule is there set forth as
follows:

'' * * * .Stated concisely, the performance of
the consideration and a change of possession
under the contract constitute a sufficient part performance. In such a case it is said that the payment of the consideration strengthens the equitable claim ·of the plaintiff arising from delivery of
possession, and that the vendor having accepted
performance hy the purchaser and having placed
the latter in possession should not be allowed to
perpetrate a fraud by repudiating the contract. * * * ''
The question of part performance and the statute of
frauds is thoroughly annotated in 101 A. L. R. at page
923. At page 1053 the rule with regard to possession plus
the payment of consideration is stated as follows:
'' PosseS'sion of land by the vendee and the
payment of the purchase price under and in reliance on a parol contract for the purchase of the
land have been held in numerous cases to constitute a sufficient part performance to warrant
the specific enforcement of the contract.''
Citing cases from 29 states and territories including
federal cases.
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It should be borne in mind that in addition to the
payment of consideration and delivery of possession,
~Iadsonia Realty Company collected all of the rents, paid
all of the taxes, made all repairs and paid an income tax
on a profit in excess of $9,000.00. In the cases where payment of the consideration is held insufficient to grant
specific performance it is upon the ground that the purchase price may be recovered back. However, it is clear
that Madsonia Realty Com1Jany could not now recover
the purchase price as 11 years elapsed between the time
of the payment and the death of R. W. Madsen and it
would be the duty of the executor to plead the statute of
limitations in an action for the recovery of this money.
There are a number of other Utah cases which have
under quite similar situations imposed a trust on the
holder of the legal title.
In the case of Chadwick v. Armold,, 34 Utah 48, 95 P.
527, the defendant had promised plaintiff that he would
bid property at sheriff's sale for the plaintiff, in reliance
upon which the plaintiff did not attend the sale. The
court found that the defendant held the property in trust
for the plaintiff. The ruling of the court is stated as
follows in paragra;ph 6 of the syllabus:
''A trust ex maleficio arises whenever a person acquires the legal title to property of another
by means of an intentional false or fraudulent
verbal promise to hold the same for a certain purpose, and, having thus obtained the title, retains
and claims the property as his own.''
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In the case of V'llln Natta v. Heywood, 57 Utah 376,
195 P. 192, the plaintiff sued an executor upon an agreement to make a will in consideration of the plaintiff living with the deceased and performing services for him.
The case held that the facts justified a recovery by the
plaintiff. The rule with regard to such oral agreements is
set forth as follows:

"* * * As contended by defendants' counsel,
1

this class of cases should be scrutinized with particular care ; and unlHss under the circumstances
the proof is positive, clear, and convincing, the
relief sought should, and will, be denied. (Citing
cases) But, nevertheless, where the contract to
make testamentary disposition of property is
clear, definite, and free from doubt, such a contract will he, in effect, enforced; in other words,
equity will decree that to be done which the
parties mutually intended to be done. (Citing
cases).
''Nor do we think that, under the undisputed
facts and circumstances as shown by the record,
this is a case coming within the statute of frauds
(Comp. Laws Utah 1917, tit. 103, Sections 5811,
5813, 5817), pleaded as an affirmative defense by
the defendants.
''The contract between the deceased and the
plaintiff, although an oral one, was taken out of
the statute of frauds by reason of part performance by the plaintiff. The evidence very clearly
shows that the plaintiff remained with the deceased, rendering such service'S unto him as he
was called upon to perform under the contract
up to the time of the death of the deceased, and
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during said time was in possession of the property by arrangement made by deceased. Section
5824, tit. 103. supra, expressly provides:
'' 'Nothing in this title contained shall
be construed to abridge the powers of courts
to compel the specific performance of agreements in case of part performance thereof.'
(Citing cases).
"This ca:se, as a whole, presents, under the
facts and circumstances, no difficulties in carrying out the mutual understandings of the deceased and the plaintiff.''
In the case of Price v. Lloyd, 31 Utah 86, 86 Pac.
767, the plaintiff failed to recover for the reason that

the proof was not sufficiently clear and definite (the case
being one of an oral gift). However, the general rule
with regard to part performance was laid down as follows:
'' 3. It of course is readily conceded that a
verbal gift or parol agreement to convey land is
within the statute of frauds, and at law a nullity.
( Comp. Laws 1888, section 2831 and seetion 3918,
subd. 5; Rev. St. 1898, Section 1974.) However,
the doctrine has long been established that a
verbal agreement, if part performed, can, notwithstanding the requirements of the statute, be
enforced by a court of equity. But the foundation
of the doctrine is fraud inhering in the consequence of setting up the statute. The rule is
well stated ,by Pomeroy in his work on Specific
Performance of Contracts (page 144) :
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"'When a verbal contract has been
made, and one party has knowingly aided or
permitted the other to go on and do acts
in part performance of the agreement, acts
done in full reliance upon such agreement
as a valid and binding contract, and which
would not have been done without the agreement, and which are of such a nature as to
change the relation of the parties, and to prevent a restoration to their former condition
and an adequate compensation for the loss
by a legal judgment for damage-s, then it
would be a virtual fraud in the first party
to interpose the statute of frauds as a bar to
a completion of the contract, and thus to secure for himself all the benefit of the acts
already done in part performance, while the
other party would not only lose ·all advantage
from the bargain, but would be left without
adequate remedy for his failure or compensation for what he had done in pursuance of
it. ·To prevent the success of such a palpable fraud, equity /1'7terpo'Ses under these
circumstances, and compels an entire completion of the contract by decreeing its specific
execution.' ''

Haight v. Pearson, 11 Utah 51, 39 Pac. 479. Here
the court held that a constructive trust arose "by operation of law" when the defendant purchased an interest
in property belonging to an estate with the understanding that it would ·be for the benefit of the plaintiff. See
also Barrett v. Vickers, 100 Utah 534, 116 Pac. 2d 772,
Anderson v. Cerc-one, 54 Utah 345, 180 Pac. 586, and
Wheelright v. Roman, 50 Utah 10, 165 Pac. 513.
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On page 13 appellants state:
''It is impossible to know whether R. W. Madsen agreed to convey only his interest or his own
plus an inchoate dower right of Mrs. Madsen.''
'Ye shall point out w·herein it is clear that the sale
in 1937 by R. ,V. :Madsen to Madsonia Realty Company
·was of the entire fee simple title to the property.
Exhibit U. is the federal income tax return of Madsonia Realty Company for the year 1946. It is signed by
R. ,Y. ~Iadsen as president of the company. It was stipulated that the return bears his signature (R. 163). There
is no doubt that the ·sale of the property to the Petersons
included the inchoate dower right of Mrs. Madsen, as she
signed the contract. Page 3 of the exhibit attached to
Exhibit U. (the income tax return) gives the detail of
the capital gain by ~Iadsonia on the sale to the Petersons.
The cost of the real estate to Madsonia is listed as real
estate-$4,120, building-$6,560, or a total of $10,680.
The income tax return shows the purchase and sale of
the same interest; otherwise, it would be an incorrect
return. The same figures are in the ledger of the company. See Exhibit E. We submit that from the· facts
shown there can be no question but that the agreement
between R. W. ~fadsen and Madsonia Realty Company
was to sell the entire fee simple interest in 667 East
First South Street, Salt Lake City, Utah.
(There may be some question in the mind of the
court because the plaintiff alleges and the defendants
admit that the ·sale to the Petersons was for the price of
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$16,500 and the income tax return shows a sale for $15,500. The purcha;se price named in the contract, Exhibit
A., is $16,500, but this included $1,000 of ''personal furniture'' which necessarily does not appear on the income
tax return as there was no 1profit made on that part of
the transaction. The $1,000 item of furniture appears on
Exhibit E).

1
:HE

POINT NO.2
SHOULD IT BE HELD THAT PLAINTIFF IS NOT
ENTITLED TO A DEED FROM THE EXECUTOR, IT IS
CLEARLY ENTITLED TO A DECREE QUIETING TITLE
AGAINST THE EXECUTOR.

The court found and it is undisputed that from J anuary 1, 1937 to June, 1946, when the property was sold
to the Petersons, that Madsonia Realty Company,
through its tenan·ts, had possession of the property, collected all of the rent, paid all of the taxes· and also paid
the c~ost of rep·airs.. The p·roperty was iinp·rove·d and ·enclosed (R. 175-176). This in and of itself is sufficient to
acquire title by adverse possession as against R. W.
l\fadsen and his estate. There is no reason why Madsonia Realty Company should not have a decree quieting
title as against the executor and estate except that, having found under Point No. 1 above that the executor
should execute and deliver a deed to the Madsonia Realty
Company, there was nn purpose or reason for quieting
title against the executor. Should, however, this court
for any reason reverse the trial court on its order requirSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ing the executor to execute a deed there is no reason why
it should not then order the district court to. enter a
decree quieting title against the exe:cutor and the estate.
POINT NO.3
THE RIGHT OF THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT BARRED BY
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

The right of ~ladsonia Realty Company as set forth
under our Point No. 1 is an equitable right. The court in
permitting the plaintiff to recover the legal title from the
executor is, in effect, holding that R. W. Madsen and his
estate are trustees of the legal title for the benefit of
~Iadsonia Realty Company. The statute of limitations
does not begin to run on such a right until there has been
a demand and refusal to make the conveyance. In other
words there is no breach of the trust until the rights of
the beneficiary have been repudiated by the trustee.
This is recognized in the case of Hatch v. Hatch, 46 Utah
116, 148 Pac. 1096 in syllabus 3 as follows:

''Where an administrator of a wife sued the
executors of her husband to recover property
alleged to be her separate estate, and the allegations of the complaint, while showing lapse of
ti1ne in excess of the statute of limitations, set up
no demand and refusal, ouster, hostile assertion,
or holding on the part of the husband against the
wife, while asserting cotenancy, the married relation, and other trust or fiduciary relations against
which the limitations do not run until demand and
refusal, ouster, or open repudiation, the complaint
was not demurrable." (page 129).
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The statute of limitations can never run against a
person who is in possession of the land. This is for the
reason that the 'Person in possession has no reason to
presume that the trustee will not fulfill his obligation.
In 34 Am. Jur., page 296, Section 381, the rule is stated
as follows:
"§ 381. Persons in Possession of Land.As noted above, a statute cannot be sustained as
one of limitation where it requires one in possession ·of property to bring an action within a given
time or forfeit it, and it is laid down in a number
of cases that as a general rule, the statute of limitations does not run against one in possession of
land. Thus, the statute does not run against a
mortgagee in possession, because he is in the
actual possession of all the law gives him and the
possession itself is prima facie evidence that the
money is not paid. For a similar reason, it has
been asserted that the statute does not begin to
run against a cestui que trust in possession until
the date of his ·ousteT, no matter what the nature
of the trust may be,** * * ''

It is further stated in 55 Am. Jur., pages 784-785, Section 357, as follows :
"§ 357. Effect of Performance by Purchaser.-According to the rule that a deed is ordinarily necessary to pass strict legal title, the payInent of the entire purchase m·oney does not itself vest the legal title in the purchaser, and his
remedy where the vendor refuses to convey is in .
equity to compel specific performance.* * *After
the purchaser has fully performed, he is, in
equity, regarded as the absolute owner of an indefeasible estate, and the vendor is a naked trusSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tee having no interest •but charged with the simple
duty to convey to the purchaser upon demand.
'Vhen the payments are fully made, the entire
equitable title is in the vendee and the vendor
retains the naked legal title in trust for him. When
the contract price is fully paid, the entire title is
equitably vested in the vendee, and he may compel
a conveyance of the legal title by the vendor, his
heirs or his assigns. His equitable est~ate cannot
be lost by laches or the st·at·ute of limitations so
long as he is in the possession and enjoyment of
his estate according to his rights."
The foregoing authorities dispose of any doubt of
the plaintiff's right to a deed by reason of the bar of
the statute of limitations. However, we again point out
that if the plaintiff is not entitled to a deed from the
executor the plaintiff nevertheless is entitled to a decree
quieting title based upon adverse possession and it is
the statute of limitations itself which gives the plaintiff
such right and therefore, any benefit of limitations is
entirely in favor of the plaintiff and does not benefit the
defendants.

POINT NO.4
LARETA C. MADSEN, THE WIDOW, HAS RELEASED
HER STATUTORY DOWER.

Respondent's argument under this heading is in
support of the court's finding:
''That LaReta C. Madsen signed said contract for the purpose of and did release her statutory dower right in said property pursuant to
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Section 101-4-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1943.''
'( R. 73, Finding No. 7)

.lfr

m

It is also in answer to appellants' Point No.
and
argument in support thereof found on pages 18 to 46 of
their brief.

sn

Appellants' argument is ·divided into four headings
designated (a), (b), (c), and (d). We will consider each
of these arguments separately, but first point out that
appellants seem to rely upon a fifth point not related
the the points specifically mentioned. This is found on
page 20 where appellants state:
''The law is settled that unless a woman receives consideration she cannot release or convey
her inchoate dower interest in land.''
Appellants cite no authority, and their statement is
contrary to the authorities on the subject. The following
statement is taken from 28 C. J. S. 138-139:
"The wife's release of dower is valid and effectual without consideration inuring to herself,
if supported by an adequate consideration moving
t'O her husband, althought she may take a consideration inuring to herself as a condition of releasing dower.''
In view of the complete misstatement of the law and
a;bsence of any authority cited by appellants, we do not
deem it necessary to argue this point at length. However, we cite the following cases which hold that by
joining in a contract with her husband the wife releases
her dower rights and is ·entitled to no portion of the proceeds. See Brum.er v. Brumer, 228 N.Y.S. 63; In Re
1
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JlcBride's Estate, 235 N.W. 166; Marshall v. Reed, 211
N. \V. 637; and In Re B.rown's Estate, 14 Pacific 2nd
1107.
\Ye proceed now to discuss the arguments of appellants under the four separate headings.
On page 19 appellants state:
"'(a) Since under the theory of plaintiff
and the trial court R. W. Madsen executed the
Peterson contract as trustee of plaintiff, the signature of :Mrs. ~Iadsen was ineffectual as a release of her dower as to any one, including the
Petersons, since a wife cannot release inchoate
dower unless joined by her huband. ''
It seems that appellants are attempting to make the
fine distinction that because LeReta C. Madsen signed a
contract in which her husband was in fact acting as a
trustee, her signature to the contract is ineffectual for
the purpose of releasing her dower. If this court should
so hold then she could use the same argument against
the Petersons, the purchasers under the contract, as well
as in this action. Actually, the trial court has gone no
farther than to hold that as the situation now stands
LaReta C. Madsen has released her dower in the property in question. The court refused to order her to execute a deed to :Jfadsonia Realty Company, because, as it
reasoned, she had not contracted to do so. We will discuss this phase of the case under our Point No. 5. However, coming back to appellants' argument, they cite no
case which holds that the release of dower is ineffectual
simply because the husband was acting as trustee or was
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performing his duty to a third person who had paid him
in full for the property. All of appellants' authorities
may be distinguished by the f¥t that she did actually
join with her husband in the same instrument.

ru

roo

~~t

In the quotation from .Scribn~ on Dower, 2nd Edition, Volume 2, page 313, found on page 21 of their brief,
it is stated:
''Hence if the -conveyance of the husband be
inoperative, or if it be set aside, or avoided, the
right of dower remains unimpaired.''
We have no such situation here and will admit that if
Mr. Madsen had lived and the Peterson contract had been
rescinded for any reason or forfeited, LaReta C. Madsen
would then have been restored to her dower rights the
same as if he had taken title to real estate in the first
instanee.
In the case of Robinson v. Bates, 3 Met. (Mass. 1841)
cited by appellants at page 22, it was simply held that
where a creditor had set aside a deed which had been
given by a husband and wife such deed could no longer
be used as a release of dower. The quotation from Tiffamy on Real Property, 3rd Edition, Volume 2, at pages
22 and 23 of aprpellants' brief, indicates that in S'Ome
states the wife's dower may be released only in the same
instrument as is signed by the husband. In addition to
the fact that the husband did sign this instrument, we
believe that the rule as pointed out ,by Tiffany as the
law of some states is not now the law in Utah. Utah does
not have common law dower. Common law dower and
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curtesy were abolished as provided in Section 101-49, Utah Code Annotated, 1943. The substitute for common law dower is provided for in Section 101-4-3. The
section provides :
"One-third in value of all the legal or equitable estates in real property possessed by the
husband at any time during the marriage to which
the wife has made no relinquishment of her right
shall he set apart as her property in fee simple if
she survives him * * * * ''
This statute was copied from the Iowa Code. The
Supreme Court of Iowa has held that the common law
rule that the wife is required to join in the same instrument with her husband is not the law under the substituted statutory dower and under the emancipation
statutes now existing.
In the case of Fowler v. Chadima, 111 N.vV. 808
(I·owa 1907), the plaintiff was the widow of David H.
Fowler who in his lifetime had given a deed without his
wife's signature but the plaintiff as his wife had subsequently deeded the property to his grantee in a serparate
instrument for the purpose of releasing her dower. 'The
court held the separate deed effective to release the
dower under the modern statutes. The court said:
''The ·one question thus presented is whether
husband and wife must unite in the same deed in
order to effect a release of the latter's contingent
right of dower. In a brief showing much industry
and research, counsel for appellant has arrayed a
large number of authorities for our consideration,
many ·of which may fairly be cited in support of
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his proposition that at common law a joinder of
husband and wife in the 'same deed was necessary
to an effectual release of the wife's right of
dower; but modern innovations by statute and
otherwise, upon common-law rules affecting the
property rights of married women, have been
so great and are of such radical character that
the earlier precedents upon the subject are of but
little value, save as matters of history. According
to the ancient theory, the individuality and independence of the wife were so merged (or submerged, rather) in the person and authority of
her husband that, generally speaking, she was
held incompetent to transact any business, great
or small, with reference to her own estate, or
with reference to her interest in the estate of her
husband, unless he united with her; and, while
the hus•band could not by the conveyance of his
real estate defeat the wife's contingent interest
therein, yet, even after an absolute conveyance by
him of his own estate or interest in each property,
his wife was disqualified to release the possibility
of a right in her part, which could not ripen into
enjoyment except by his death, until he was willing to unite with her in executing the necessary
writing for that purpose. If there was ever any
good reason for this rule, it has ceased to exist.
In many, if not all, of all the later cases cited by
the counsel for appellant, the decision has been
reached, not S'O much because of reliance upon the
common law rule, as because the terms of the statute of the particular state seem to require the
deed or release to he executed by both husband
and wife. Our own statute does not attempt to
prescribe the manner or form in which dower
may 'be released. It does provide (Code, Sec.
2919) that a married woman may convey or incumber real estate or any interest therein belongSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ing to her, and may control the s·ame, or contract
with reference thereto, to the same extent and in
the same manner as other persons. Technically
speaking, dower, in the common-law sense of the
term, has long been abolished in this state, and the
wife's interest in her deceased husband's lands is
a distributive share of one-third in fee of all the
real property possessed by him during his marriage, ·which has not heen sold on judicial sale,
'and to which the wife has made no relinquishment of her right.' Now, although a contingent
dower right may not be an estate, it certainly
does constitute an interest in land which is recognized by the statute as being the subject of relinquishment by her in the life of her husband.
Such being the case, it would seem that, under the
general terms of Code, Sec. 2919, cited, its relinquishment may be accomplished by her 'in the
same manner' as other persons not laboring under
the disabilities of coverture would relinquish a
contingent or remote inter·est in like property.
So long as the husband retains his title to the
land, there is good reason for saying the wife
should not be empowered to convey or transfer
her dower right to a stranger. There is also
obviously good reason for saying that, when a
husband has by his 'separate deed conveyed the
fee to a third person, it should not be competent
for his wife to convey or transfer her contingent
interest to a stranger to the title, and the statute
has wisely provided that a wife's contingent interest in her husband's property shall not be subject of contract or traffic between them; hut,
when the husband has once conveyed the fee, why
should the wife not be at liberty to relinquish her
dower interest to the purchaser with or without
her husband's consent~
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''The wife's deed, under such circumstances
is not a grant or conveyance, in the legal sense of
the term, though we frequently use those tenns
as applicable to her act. She has no estate in the
land which she can grant or eonvey to another.
She has at most a contingent interest, a !possibility of an estate which may accrue to her in
the event that she outlives her husband, and,
while 'she cannot sell or convey it to another, she
can release or relinquish it in favor of the owner
of the fee, save only where the owner of the fee
is her husband. Her relinquishment adds nothing
to the quality of the estate of the fee owner, but
it removes a burden or incumbrance therefrom.
By enabling a married woman to engage in business in her own name, and to buy, s·ell, own, and
control property as freely and effectively as her
husband can do, our statute necessarily subjects
her· to the ordinary rules of the law of estoppel, and when upon a sufficient consideration
moving dire'ctly to her, or upon a consideration moving to her husband in the sale of the fee
of his land, she by deed or by formal release, relinquishes her dower right, she should be held
estopped to say that, notwithstanding such conveyance or relinquishment, she still demands
an admeasurement of dower upon the husband's
death. Indeed, it was the general rule, even at
common law, that the wife's release of dower was
held operative as an estoppel, rather than as a
contract. Gillilan v. Swift, 14 Hun. (N.Y.) 574;
Reiff v. Horst, 55 Md. 42. And deeisions holding
her estopped by her separate deed were not unknown before the modern statutes emancipating
women from most of the disabilities of coverture.
Shepherd v. Howard, 2 N.H. 507; Fowler v.
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Shearer, 7 Mass. 14; Irving v. Campbell, (Super.
Ct.) ± N. Y. Supp. 103; N el~son v. Holly, 50 Ala.
3."
The cases cited by appellants which require the release of dower to be by instrument joined in by the husband are not the law in Iowa, from which state we
adopted our statute. However, were these cases the law
of Utah, we again point out that LaReta C. Madsen did
sign "\Yith her husband to release her dower.
At page 26 appellants state:
"(b) Even if LaReta C. Madsen agreed to
conYey her dower rights to the Petersons, that
fact does not enlarge the rights of plaintiff.''
The burden of appellants' argument under this point
seems to be that there is no privity between the Madsoni:a
Realty Company and the Petersons with whom the contract signed by LaReta G. Madsen was made. Certainly if
the argument under (a) of appellants' P<lint No. III is
based upon the fact that R. W. Madsen was acting ~s
trustee for Madsonia Realty Company, then Madsonia
Realty Company is in equity and is actually the seller of
the property, and there is privity of contract between
~Iadsonia and the Petersons. We not only do not admit
that there is no privity between Madsonia Realty Company and the Petersons, but our very claim is that Madsonia Realty Company sold the property to the Petersons, collected all of the money so far paid and Madsonia
is obligated to deliver title. So far as we are concerned,
we are willing to consider that the contract is the same as
if it had been signed by Madsonia Realty Company and
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LaReta C. Madsen as the sellers. We claim, therefore,
the same relationship between Madsonia Realty Company and the Petersons as if Madsonia Realty Company
were actually named as the vendor. Cases wherein
the dower right has been released to a third person
whose title never materializes are not in point. It is
such situations that are discussed in Scribne.r on Dower,
Volume 2, page 307, quoted at page 27 of appellants'
brief and in the case of Pixley v. Bennett, 11 Mass. 298,
and Kitzmiller v. ~arv Rensselaer, 10 Ohio State 63,
cited at page 30 of their brief.
Appellants cite the case of Gee, et al. v. Baum, et al.,
58 Utah 445, 199 Pacific 680 (see page 31). The question in this case was whether or not a deed which had
been signed by a husband and wife but which had never
been delivered could constitute a release of the widow's
dower. Of course, it was held that it did not, and we
admit that any instrument signed by a wife which never
becomes effective because of non-delivery cannot operate
as a release of dower.
In the case of In Re Reynolds' Estate, 62 Pacific
(2d) 270, 90 Utah 415 (cited by appellants at page 32),
it was held that the giving of a mortgage by a husband
and wife in the lifetime of the husband did not constitute a release of dower by the widow so far as it affected
the mnount of property which she could claim after the
death of her husband as against other heirs, creditors
of the deceased, or amount owing for inheritance taxes.
The 1nortgage had not been foreclosed. The court points
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out that a mortgagee receives no equitable or legal title,
nothing is transferred to the mortgagee and the only
effect of signing by the wife is to release her dower in
the event the mortgage is foreclosed.
In the case of Free v. Little, 31 Utah 449, 88 Pacific
407 (cited at page 33 of appellants' brief), there was
an attempt to specifically enforce a c'Ontract of sale,
purely executory except as to the payment of $60 (the
contract being for $12,000). The wife had never signed
the contract and it was necessarily held that specific
performance would not be granted. frhere is no analogy
to the present situati'On.
Appellants' third argument under Point No. III
is as follows:
'' (c) The seller under an executory con tract
of sale of real property retains a 'legal or equitable estate in real property.' Under our statute
the widow shares in this interest.''
Here the burden 'Of appellants' argument seems to he
that because after signing a contract a husband has some
interest until he is paid, the wife's dower attaches to
such interest. The argument is even made that because
a wife's dower does not attach to the buyer's interest,
it must attach to the seller's interest. The wife has only
one dower right in one piece of property. If she signs
away that right or releases that right, certainly she does
not have another dower interest, whatever rights the
vendor still may have. A prpellants are trying to- give her
a second dower interest. We submit that if she has re1
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leased her dower in a spe-cific piece of property by the
signing of a contract, that ends the matter, and there
is no use of further discussion as to what interest the
vendor still may have. We have already pointed out
that the signing of the contract by a wife gives her no
interest in the proceeds. We have hesitated to conclude
that appellants' argument under this portion of the brief
is simply that the widow has a dower interest in what is
left in her husband after she has released her dower hy
signing the contract, but we can make nothing else of the
argument. On page 44 appellants conclude this phase
of the argument by the statement:
''However, even if the Court finds that the
Peterson contract was joined by her as the wife
of Mr. Madsen, it is nevertheless clear upon
principle and authority that she retains a distributive share interest in the land which the
:plaintiff in this case has no right to acquire.''
The same statement is in substance found on page 41 as
follows:
"In Utah, therefore, under our statute, when
a husband and wife join in an executory sales contract, the wife has a distributive share interest
in the equity retained by the sellers, which she
may assert against all the world, subject only
to the right of the buyer upon his full performance.''
We have set forth the two foregoing quotations
from appellants' brief as showing that their position is
simply an attempt to claim dower in what is left in the
real estate contract after the wife has signed the contract
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for the express purpose of releasing her dower. To so
hold would mean that a complete release could never
be secured as the husband as vendor has some interest
until the contract is paid and a conveyance made. But
this interest is not subject to dower when the wife has
signed the contract to sell.
Appellants cite the case of Tyler v. Tyler, 50 Mont.
65, 1-!-! Pacific 1090 (page 42 of their brief) for the
proposition that "it has been held that it is contrary
to the policy of the law to apply a technical doctrine
to defeat a wife's dower." The case simply holds that
where a wife has signed an option to sell, which option
has not been exercised at the date of death of her husband, the property is not then ''converted'' to personalty and the widow still has a dower interest in the land.
This is for the reason that there is, at the time of death,
no contract of sale. The court recognized that if there
were a contract to sell the opposite result must necessarily follow. The court said (page 1091 of 144 Pacific):
''The distinction between such a transaction
(an option) and an agreement to sell was clearly
pointed out in Ide v. Leiser, 10 Montana 5, 24
Pacific 695, 24 Am . .St. Rep. 17. The one is the
sale of an option-an executed contract-which
has not become an agreement to 'sell until the
election has been exercised. The other is an executory agreement which either party may require the other to perform according to its
terms.''
In this case it is the a'Ppellant, LaReta C. Madsen,
who is trying to seize upon a technicality to secure her
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dower. This will be pointed out hereafter under Point
No. 7. It is clear that R. W. Madsen intended that his
two sons should receive the stock in Madsonia Realty
Company which necessarily includes all of its assets.
LaReta C. Madsen is trying to secure for herself more
than was intended by the will even though it has given
her more than one-third of all of her husband's estate.
Under (d) appellants state:
"'The execution of a contract to sell land does
not extinguish the sellers' interest in the land."
This argument is nothing more than a repetition of
(c). The argument which follows, for what purpose we
do not know, tries to draw an analogy between the
wife's dower interest and tenants in common. It is
argued that because a purchaser from tenants in common would have to pay both of the tenants, the Petersons
as purchasers from R. W. Madsen must also pay part of
the purchase price to LaReta C. Madsen. We have answered this argument under Point No. 4, page 21, supra.
While we feel that there is nothing further to be said on
this subject, we point out that the tenancy in common
argument is contrary to all of the appellants' statements that the wife's interest is merely a contingent
expectancy. There are no rules which can be followed
. to determine the amount which should be paid to a wife
under these circumstances even if it were held that she
is entitled to any of the proceeds of the sale.
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POINT NO.5
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO AN ORDER REQUIRING
THE WIDOW TO DEED THE PROPERTY TO MADSONIA
REALTY COMPANY.

The trial court denied plaintiff's right to a deed
from LaReta C. Madsen. On this point we cross-appeal.
Madsonia Realty Company in its original petition in
probate had asked nothing from LaReta C. Madsen.
When she intervened and asked for an adjudication of
her rights Madsonia then asked affirmative relief against
her by reply. While the ultimate result may he the :same
whether she is compelled to give a deed to Madsonia
now or to give a deed to the Petersons or their successors
in interest when the contract is fully paid, Madsonia
Realty ·Company is nevertheless entitled at this time to
a deed from her for the following rerusons:
The trial court in refusing to order her to give a deed
reasoned that her agreement under the contract was
only to give a deed to the vendees when ~ayment was
completed, and an order now would be premature. If the
contract should be forfeited she would never be called
upon to deed the property to the Petersons. We may
concede that this would be true if R. W. Madsen were now
living. But the rule is not the same if the forfeiture
occurs after the death of the vendor.
Whether property is realty or personalty for the
purpose of dower and distr~bution to heirs must be decided once and for all as of the date of death of the
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owner. 'The law of inheritance or right to statutory
dower cannot be altered by an event occurring subsequent to death.
Suppose this were a case where only the widow and
heirs were now involved and it becomes time for distribution. Without question the proceeds from the sale received subsequent to the death of R. W. Madsen would
be distributed as personalty and LaReta C. Madsen
would be given no one-third dower interest in what has
been paid pending probate. The unpaid portion of the
purchase price would also be distributed as personalty.
Could the Decree of Distribution be changed by a forfeiture of the contract after distribution~ If it could, the
result would be hopeless confusion and uncertainty. For
the same reason and upon the same legal theory, the
change from personalty to realty cannot be made by
forfeiture after death. The decedent is not seized of the
realty at the time of death under a contract of sale. The
forf·eiture after death does not vest a deceased with
the title to real estate in his lifetime. The statute gives
dower only to property owned during marriage, and this
does not mean property coming back by forfeiture after
death. This is supported by authorities.
The following statement is taken from 55 Am. Jur.,
pages 785 and 786, Section 359 :
"The equitable principle that the interest of
the vendor under an executory land contract is to
be regarded as personalty has been frequently applied in the distribution of a deceased vendor's
estate; accordingly, it is held that the vendor's
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interest in the land which he has contracted to
sell~ passes to his personal representative as
pe)onalty, together with the right to the unpaid
purchase money and securities therefore."
The same rule is laid down in the case of Bowne v.
Ide, 109 Conn. 307, 147 Atlantic 4, 66 A.L.R. 1036 at page
1041 as follows:
''The estate of an owner of real estate under
contract of sale, under the doctrine of equitable
conversion, becomes in equity an estate in personalty, and in case of his death before his contract
is performed, or fully performed, the contraet and
the proceeds thereof are personal property or
assets in the hands of his administrator or personal representative, to be administered as the
rest of his personal assets are administered.
Emery v. Cooley, 83 Conn. 235, 76 Atl. 529; note
in Ann. Cas. 1914D, page 419."
The following statement is taken from 19 Am. Jur.,
pages 15 and 16:
"On the other hand, the vendor's interest
under a contract for the sale of land constitutes
personalty and on his death is distributable as
such, together with the unpaid purchase money
and ·securities therefore. Even whe.re the land is
recovered back by the widow and heirs of the
ow"ner .after his death, urvd,er a clause of forfeiture
in the cont11act of sale, its status is not changed
and it is distributed to the heirs of the deceased
owner ·as pe.rsonal property.''
LaReta G. Madsen should he required to deed the
property to Madsonia subject to the Peterson contract
to avoid future litigation. It is the general rule that a
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court of equity will make final disposition of litigation.
While it will be clear that upon the payment of the purchase price by the Petersons, or their successors in interest, that they can compel L.aReta C. Madsen, by
reason 'Of having signed the contract, to convey the prop~
erty:) she may refuse to do so, which will require another
law suit. :She has chosen to litigate her rights to the real
estate and the proceeds thereof in this action. She should,
therefore, be precluded from further raising the question. A forfeiture now will not restore her dower. A
deed from her to :Madsonia Realty Company will finally
dispose of the matter. The equity rule referred to is
clearly set forth in 19 Am. Jur., 281 (Equity 409) as follows:
"§ 409. Disposal of Litigation.-It is a
fundamental principle of chancery courts finally
to dispose of litigation, making as complete a decision on all the points embraced in a cause as the
nature of the case will admit, so as to preclude
not only all further litigation between the same
parties, but also the possibility that the parties
may at any future period be disturbed or harrassed by the claim of any other person, as well as
the possibility of any danger or injustice being
done to other persons who are not ,before the
court in the present proceedings. Acting pursuant
to this principle, courts of equity require not only
that the pleadings shall so present all the matters
in controversy that they may be properly adjudicated, but also that, so far as practicable, all
persons having any interest in the subject matter
of the controversy be made parties, to the end that
their rights ma~T be ascertained, their claims
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adjudged, or their titles bound. The extent of
the relief that the court will grant is therefore
commensurate with the rights, duties, claims,
and titles of all the parties to the suit, so far as
those rights, duties, claims, and titles appear in
the pleadings and are established by the prouf.
·'The decree should be adapted to the· circumstances and necessities of each case and
should be so designed as to put an end to the
litigation, and not to foster it. A final decree
which undertakes to dispose of the whole cause
should include a disposition of i'Ssues which are
raised by a cross bill and answer as well as those
which are presented by the pleadings in chief.
''Where several parties, being all those interested in a legal controversy, are before thecourt asking that their respective rights be determined, and such rights are capable of ascertainment, a decree, based upon indefinite findings,
which does not determine the essential rights of
all the parties and leaves a material part of the
controversy undetermined, is insufficient and
will not be upheld on appeal.''
POINT NO.6
THE RELEASE OF DOWER WAS NOT SECURED BY
FRAUD.

This subdivision of uur brief is in direct answer to
Point No. IV of appellants' brief which is argued at
pages 46 to 59. Nowhere is it claimed by LaReta C.
Madsen that any affirmative misrepresentations were
made as an inducement to sign the contract.

This is.

particularly interesting in view of the allegations in her
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pleading. The following is her claim as set forth in
paragraph 4 of her amended counterclaim (R. 55, 56):

'' * * * That at the time of entering into the
said contract said R. W. Madsen and Madsonia
Realty Company through its agents and servants
advised LaReta C. Madsen that said Mr. and Mrs.
Madsen would have no further use for the said
property inasmuch as R. W. Madsen and LaReta
C. Madsen had their homes at the Hotel Utah and
in Cottonwood; that s~aid property was that of
said R. W. Mads en, arnd that it would be to their
best interest to sell the s~ame to said Petersons
amd to re,alize the value thereof; * * * that at the
time of the execution of the said contract to James
0. Peterson and C. Amelia Peterson, LaReta C.
M~ad,sen believed and was led to believe by the
words ~and ,acts of the Staid Richard W. Mads en
for himself or on behalf of Madsonia Realty
Company that said property was the property of
R. W. Madsen only."
She completely failed to support the allegation of
misrepresentation. In fact, she made no attempt to
do so. The only testimony in regard to the matter was
given by Mrs. Madsen on direct examinations as follows:
'' Q.

Mrs. Madsen, did you at any time prior to
the death of R. W. Madsen know that anyone
had any interest in 667 East First South
other than R. W. Madsen and the Petersons 1

A.

No.

Q.

I will show you now what has been marked
Exhibit A, a uniform real estate contract,
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and call your attention to a signature on the
back, LaReta C. Madsen. Is that your signature?
A. Yes.
Q. Had you ever discussed this contract with
anyone other than R. W. Madsen 1
A. No.
Q. Where was the contract signed 1
~\. As I recollect, it was- Thfr. Madsen brought
it to our home, and I signed it." (R. 191-192')
The strength of Mrs. Madsen's position can, we
believe, be well estimated by the difference in her pleading and proof. She did not hesitate to plead fraudulent
misrepresentations by her deceased husband, but did not
have the courage to go through with the accusation.
There were no affirmative misrepresentations and
she relies solely upon failure to dis3lose. No authority
is cited which requires as a condition to the validity of
a transaction that all pos-sible matters motivating the
transaction or things which can be considered as background be affirmatively stated. She did not testify that
she would not have. signed the contract if she knew that
her husband had already sold the property to Madsonia
Realty Company. She personally was promised nothing
in any event and it made no difference to her personally
whether the property had already 'been sold or not.
Undoubtedly if she had had the temerity to ask her husband that she be paid a part of the purchase pri,ce or
be paid for the release of her dower, he would have paid
her. We assert, however, that it made no difference to
LaReta C. Madsen personally whether the property had
already been sold or not, but if it was a material matter
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to her 'She could very well have asked with regard to the
disposition of the purchase price. Her hus·band was
under the legal duty of doing whatever was necessary
to consummate the sale which he had made on behalf
of Madsonia Realty Company, and she should have asked
her price at the time she signed the contract or been
satisfied with the legal effect thereof.
We wish here to point out that it is not disputed
that R. W. Madsen received cash for the property in
1937 and that a part o.f the pur.chase price actually was
turned over to his wife, LaReta C. Madsen. We have
heretofore mentioned the account which R. W. Madsen
carried with the Madsonia Realty Company in which
he was given credit for the purchase price of $10,680
on January 1, 1937. This account is shown in the ledger
and was introduced in evidence as Exhibit F. The following are the complete debit and credit entries from
Oct. 10, 1935 to April 5, 1937, the account having been
balanced prior to Oct. 10, 1935, and again on the last
date given:
CREDITS
Date
Items
Fol. Credits
By TransferJune 1,1936
W. L. & Blg. Co.
$1,307.63
285
Aug. 13, 1936 By Cash
740.27
By Cash
309
Feb. 8,1937
301.62
Feb.20,1937 By Cash
310
140.00
By Cash
Mar.1,1937
312
100.00
Mar.14,1937 By Cash
314
300.00
Jan.1,1937
By R. E. 667 E. 1st So.
304 10,680.00
May 24,1937 By Cash
322
664.22
ToTAL CREDITS $14,233.7 4
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DEBITS
Date

Oct. 10, 1935
Oct. 1S, 1935
Oct. 1S, 1935
Dec. 4,1935
Dec. 21, 1935
Dec. 30, 1935
Dec. 31, 1935
AprilS, 1936
April20, 1936
JuneS, 1936
June 22, 1936
July 15, 1936
July 29, 1936
Jan. 5,1937
Jan.S,1937
Jan.S,1937
Jan.30,1937
Feb.13,1937
Feb.17,1937
Feb.17,1937
Mar.S,1937
Mar.29,1937
Mar.29,1937
Mar.29,1937
Mar.31,1937
Apr. 5,1937

Items

To Bank Loan
To Bank Loan
To Bank Z.C.M.I.
To Bank
To Bank
To Bank
To Bank
LaReta C. Madsen
LaReta C. Mads en
LaReta C. llf ads en
LaReta C. Madsen
Int. Silver Co.
Cash
1'Share Hotel Utah
~Ioney going East
Rwy. Ticket
Z.C.M.I.
Loan
R. W. Madsen Jr.
Adams L.D.S. Chur'ch
Loan
Mrs. L. C. Madsen
Utah State Nat'l Bank
Utah State Nat'l Bank
Standard Furn. Co.
Wife
4 Shares Utah S. Nat'l

Fol.

Debits

250
251
251
258
259
259
259'
271
272
280
280
2S1
2S3
305
305
305
307
310
310
310
313
315
315

1,000.00
42.00
395.68
456.00
1,250.00
201.28
155.04
205.00
175.00
1,220.00
7SO.OO
S67.90
300.00
57.50
300.00
25S.95
706.02
100.00
140.00
300.00
56S.55
1,1S7.50
2,500.00
10.42

315
316

196.90
860.00

ToTAL DEBITS $14,233.74
It will be noticed that during this period LaReta
received credits totalling $3,567.50 (R. 73, Finding No.
S), $1,187.50 of which was after the sale of the home.
(Ex. F., R. 190.)
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In regard to the credit to the account of LeReta
C. Madsen which showed that she received a total of
$3,567.50 from the ~ount of R. W. Madsen, it is interesting to note that during the trial when all parties had
rested the trial court pointed out the facts with regard
to such credits to LaReta C. Madsen (R. 193-195) and
stated its intention to rule against her on this ground
(R. 190). Thereupon her attorney asked leave to reopen (R. 190). :She, in the face of the book entries,
denied receipt of any money from Madsonia. The following is he-r testimony which is anything but convincing.
Note that she denies receipt of any money from Madsonia, except money which she borrowed, when the books
positively show that she received money through Madsonia, not as a loan, but which had been credited to her
account from the account of R. W. Madsen.

'' Q. Mrs. Madsen, did you ever have an account
with the Madsonia· Realty Company~
A.

Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know how long you had an account
with that company~
A.

I ,can't recollect.

Q. Do you have a recollection within any particular period at all whether or rrot you had
an account with that company~
A.

I used to borrow money and pay it hack to
the company. Mr. Madsen let me do that.

Q. Was that the only transa.ction you had with
Madsonia, was as to money which you borrowed from that company~
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A.

As far as I remember, it is the onlyTHE COUR-T: I didn't hear you.

A.

As far as I remember, it is the only ones.

Q.

Did ~Ir. Madsen ever put any money in that
account for you Y

A.

I don't understand your question.

Q.

Well, I think it is plain.· Would you read it,
please, Reporter, and see if you can't understand it.

A. What account'

Q. vV ell, the account that we have been speaking
of here between you and the Madsonia, your
account and the Madsonia Realty Company.
A. I borrowed m"Oney from the Madsonia Realty
Company and paid it back. Mr. Madsen
never paid any of the account hack.

Q. You don't know of any time when Mr. Madsen
put any money in that account for you'
A.

Not that I know of.

Q. And the only transactions that you re~all
are transactions wherein you borrowed money and paid it back,.
A.

That's all I can recollect.

Q.

Mrs. Madsen, I show you a sheet from the
ledger of what has been testified as the Madsonia Realty Company and a:sk you to look
at the third ite1n on the right-hand side of
that sheet, this i tern here (indicating). First,
I will ask you, Mrs. Madsen, this sheet has
your name, LaReta C. Madsen, at the top,
does it not'
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A. Yes.
Q. Would you look at the third item on the
right-hand side and see if that refreshes your
recollection with regard to the matters that
I have been asking you about¥
.A. No, this does not. I do not know about this,
as far as I can recollect.
Q.

Do you know what that entry in the book
shows, Mrs. Madsen, from the point of view
of bookkeeping¥

.A. I haven't seen this before, and I don't understand it as far as I can recollect at all.

Q. Do you understand the purpose of keeping
an account between you and the Madsonia
Realty Company¥
MR. BURTON: If the Court please, that
is immaterial. She's answered she doesn't
have any understanding.
THE COURT': Let's tell her that that
represents on the books that the Madsonia
was giving her credit for whatever that item
shows.
MR. BURTON: I don't know that that
shows that, Judge.
THE COURT : Well, if it is in the righthand side, I will tell you that it does; help
your education in accounting matters. That
is what it is if it is on the right side. Would
that help you now, Mrs. Madsen, if you knew
that item represented some credit to your
account, either where you or someone else
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had paid or some credit had been given fo'r
some loan like that~ Would that help you
to remember 1
A.

I can't recall this.

THE COURT: All right.'' (R. 193-195)
At page -± 7 of appellants' brief it is stated:
''It is ,clear that :Mrs. Madsen knew nothing
of the alleged 1937 transaction between her husband and the corporation, and it is not questioned
and cannot be that Mrs. Madsen did not know
that the consideration all went to the corporation
instead of to her.''
The consideration last spoken of is the money paid
by the Petersons. It is immaterial that she knew or
did not know what became of this money as Madsonia
Realty Company had bought and paid for the prope-rty
and in turn sold the property to Mr. and Mrs. Peterson.
However, she obviously did not expect any of the
purchase price, as the down-payment of $4,000 and
monthly payments for a period of two years all went
to the corporation before her husband's death. There
is no suggestion that she ever questioned any of such
payments or made inquiry with regard thereto in the
lifetime of R. W. :Madsen.
While it is likewise immaterial, there is affirmative
evidence which indicates Mrs. Madsen may have known
of the 1937 trans acton: We call attention to the entries
on the ledger sheet of R. W. Madsen with the Madsonia
Realty Company wherein LaReta C. Madsen received
certain specific money. One item of $1,187.50 dated
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March 29, 1937, is a part of the proceeds of the sale.
Her testimony that she received nothing from Madsonia
Realty Company except that she "borrowed" money is
completely contradicted by the record. (See Exhibit F.
set forth at P.P. 42-43, supra.)
Appellants state at page 48:
''The record indicates that Mrs. Madsen believed all of the money from the sale of the home
at 667 East 1st South went into the joint bank
account that she and her husband had at the Utah
8tate National Bank (R. 202-203)."
This statement is directly in conflict with the record.
·The testimony is as follows:

'' Q. Mrs. Madsen, do you recall that on an examination where you were the witness in this
court, another division of this court, that we
discussed the joint bank account between you
and your husband in what was the Utah State
National Bank of approximately $21,000.00,
that you stated that your recollection was that
part of the money from the sale of the Madsen home at 667 East First South went into
that account~
MR. BURTON: We object to that as
not being the statement that was made.
THE COURT : The objection is ·overruled. You may answer if you made that
statement.
A.

I did not make that statement as far as I
remember.
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Q.

Well, how well do you remember, Mrs. Madsen! Do you want to say that you did not
make that statement?

A.

I am quite positive I did not make that 'Statement." (R. 202)

It was our intention to recall to Mrs. Madsen's
memory a statement that she had made to the effect that
a part of the $21,000 in a joint bank account (which
she has withdrawn for herself) was made up in part
from the proceeds of the sale of this particular property.
Instead of testifying that she thought the money went
into the joint bank account, she stated, "I am quite
positive I did not make that statement." Such answer
certainly does not show that she thought the money from
the home went into the joint bank account. While the
record is clear that the money from the sale to Petersons
in 1946 went to Madsonia Realty Company, the money on
the sale in 1937 to Madsonia Realty Company went to
the account of R. W. Madsen, and ~part of it went through
his account to the account of Mrs. Madsen.
None ·of the authorities cited by appellants with regard to the .claim of fraud are in point. In the case of
Nissen vs. Nissen Trampoline Co., 39 N.W. 2nd 92,
cited at page 50, the husband affirmatively represented
the documents to be deeds of the corporation when they
were in fact conveyances to the corporation. As appears
by appellants' own statement, the case of K ratli vs.
Booth, 191 N.E. 180, 99 Ind. App. 178, was one of affirmaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tive fraudulent representations. The same is true of the
case of Stokes vs. Stokes, 196 N.Y.S. 184, 119 N.Y.
Misc. 168, cited at page 56.

of

At page 58 appellants further state:

''She expected that he was going to get the
money under the Peterson contract.''
We ask appellants to point out in the record where
there is anything to support such a statement. She and
her counsel seem to be considerably confused as to
whether it was he or she that was to be paid. At page
47 they state:
''It is not questioned and cannot he that Mrs.
Madsen did not know that the consideration all
went to the corporation instead of to her."
We submit that as in the case of sales generally by
a husband of lands owned by him, Mrs. Madsen simply
signed the contract at the request of her husband, asking
nothing and expecting nothing, well knowing that her
husband had and would amply provide for her.

POINT NO.7
LARETA C. MADSEN IS ESTOPPED, BY CLAIMING
THE BENEFITS OF THE WILL, FROM ASSERTING ANY
DOWER RIGHT IN THIS PARTICULAR PIECE OF REALTY.

The will of R. W. Madsen and the codicil thereto is
attached to plaintiff's reply (R. 28 to 33, inclusive).
This will and codicil was admitted in evidence (R. 161).
In paragraph 4 of the will it is recited that the shares
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of stock in Madsonia were given by
two sons on the 1st day of July 1931.
bequeathed the specific stock to his
that such gift should be held invalid.

the testator to his
'The testator then
sons in the event
The will provides :

''Irrespective of the foregoing and to the end
my sons shall have and own all of the shares of
said Madsonia Realty Company, I hereby devise
and bequeath to them equally all shares which I
may own or have any interest in in said company
at the time of my death.''
The testator further provides that his wife shall
take 'One-third of his real estate by operation of law and
that the remaining two-thirds shall go to his sons in
equal shares (Para. 5, R. 29). All of the personal property is given two-thirds to his sons, Richard W. Madsen,
Jr., and Francis A. Madsen, and the remaining one-third
to his wife, LaReta C. Madsen (Para. 7, R. 30). By his
codicil the testator subsequently gave his Cottonwood
home, together with all furnishings, and certain specifi~
furnishings at the Hotel Utah to his wife (see codicil,
R. 32 and 33). His widow, therefore, receives more than
one-third of his estate, which estate is approximately a
half million dollars (R. 204). Nevertheless, the will is
clear that the deceased intended his sons to have Madsonia, as he bequeathed them the stock in the event the
gift should he held incomplete. The testator's intention
necessarily includes all of the assets whi!ch he personally had entered on the books of the corporation.
It is clear, therefore, that the decedent intended that
the Peterson property or the proceeds from the sale
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of the Peterson property would belong to his sons. LaReta C. Madsen has irrevocably accepted the benefits of
the will. See the pre-trial statement (R. 37, 101) . .Should
LaReta C. Madsen succeed in any of her contentions that
she is entitled to a one-third interest in the Peterson
property or any portion of the purchase price, then to
that exent she defeats the clear intent of the testator
as expressed in the will, the benefits of which she has
accepted.
CONCLUSION
We submit that the trial ~court did not err in its
holding that Madsonia Realty Company is entitled to a
deed from the executor; that the right of the plaintiff to
such deed is not barred by the statute of limitations; that
LaReta C. Madsen, the widow, has released her statutory dower interest in the property; that such release was
not procured by fraud, and that LaReta C. Madsen is
further estopped from claiming dower in this particular
property because she has accepted the benefits of the
will.
We further submit that the trial court should have
ordered and this court should now require the trial court
to order that LaReta C. Madsen execute a deed ~conveying
the Peterson property to Madsonia Realty Company,
this for the purpose of preventing any possible future
litigation upon matters which have been adjudicated
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herein. We also suggest that should this court reverse
the trial court in its order that the executor execute a
deed to Madsonia Realty Company, that as an alternative it order the trial court to enter a decree quieting
title against said executor and the estate of Richard W.
Madsen, deceased (see our Point No.2).
RespEftfully submitted,
CHENEY, MARR, WILKINS: &
CANNON,

.Attto,rneys jorr Resppndent
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